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Tradition and Practical Knowledge 
J. C. Nyiri 
1. Preamble 1 
The first task of this chapter is to indicate how the topic 
of practical knowledge might involve, or why it should 
involve, an analysis of the notion of tradition. Such an 
indication is in fact not difficult to give. After all, both 
practical knowledge and knowledge embedded in tradi-
tion are kinds of knowledge that seem to lie outside the 
domain of reflection or reasoning; both presuppose an 
epistemological subject whose activity encompasses more 
than the life of pure cognition - a subject to whose 
make-up there belong essentially traits other than the 
purely mental. No wonder, then, that philosophers with 
an eye for the dimension of practice in knowledge will 
usually not fail to draw attention also to the special ways 
in which that dimension is transmitted: to ways of custom, 
to institutions of handing down, that is: to traditions. 
Thus Ryle stresses that learning how is different from 
learning that: the former involves, as the latter does not, 
inculcation. 2 i.e. persistent repetition, impressing itself 
upon the subject. Thus also Michael Polanyi, after having 
argued that the rules of scientific discovery are no more 
than •rules of art', goes on to point out that, since 'an 
art cannot be precisely defined, it can be transmitted only 
by examples of the practice which embodies it'. 3 Science, 
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he writes at another place, 'is operated by the skill of 
the scientist', 4 by a skill that, again, can be passed on 
only by example. But to learn by example is to submit to 
authority: 
By watching the master and emulating his efforts in 
the presence of his example, the apprentice uncon-
sciously picks up the rules of the art, including those 
which are not explicitly known to the master himself. 
These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a per-
son who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically 
to the imitation of another, 
- that is, by a person who is willing to 'submit to tradi-
tion'. 5 Oakeshott, too, points out that the coherence of 
scientific activity does not 'lie in a body of principles or 
rules to be observed by the scientist, a "scientific method".' 
That coherence, he stresses, lies 'in the way the scientist 
goes about his investigation, in the traditions of scientific 
inquiry'. 6 And one of the main claims of T. S. Kuhn is of 
course that we have too long ignored the manner in which 
knowledge of nature can be tacitly embodied in whole ex-
periences without intervening abstraction of criteria or 
generalisations. Those experiences are presented to us 
during education and professional initiation by a genera-
tion which already knows what they are exemplars of. ;, 
Even Feyerabend, having, in Science in a Free Society, 
once more made his peace with Wittgenstein, writes of 
'standards or rules' we could not use were they not 'well 
integrated parts of a rather complex and in places quite 
opaque practice or tradition'. 9 As to Wittgenstein himself, 
one need recall only the central role his arguments played 
in turning into a philosophical issue the idea of knowledge 
embedded in, or constituted by, practice. When G. H. von 
Wright, interpreting Wittgenstein's On Certainty, coined 
the notion of 'pre-knowledge', knowledge that is not 
propositional but rather a matter of praxis, 9 the profes-
sion was quick to point out that the appropriate term 
here was not •pre-' knowledge, but, precisely, practical 
knowledge. 1 0 And I would like to underline that in those 
_arguments of Wittgenstein in which the idea of practical 
knowledge essentially figures, the concept of tradition, 
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too, almost always crops up, expressed by terms like 
Gepflogenheit, Gebrauch, Institution, Lebensform, Autoritlit, 
and so on. 1 1 
2. The Infinite Regress 
My point of departure is, then, roughly this: since prac-
tical knowledge encompasses, or serves as a foundation 
for much of what we know, and since such knowledge 
appears to be tacit, non-propositional, and indeed inarti-
culable, 1_ 2 it follows that channels of communication other 
than explicit discourse have indispensable functions to 
fulfil. Traditions represent just such channels. 
That this initial position leads immediately to a whole 
family of difficulties is clear. The first such difficulty 
is presented by the notion of practical knowledge itself, 
which seems on occasion precisely not to require any 
social context of transmission. Take skills, for example. 
Clearly skills are, or embody, practical knowledge; but 
not all skills presuppose a social context. Thus cycling, 
one of Polanyi's favourite examples, 1 3 involves a vast 
amount of tacit knowledge, in the sense that the mathemat-
ical description of what happens at every moment as one 
adjusts the curvature of one's bicycle's path in proportion 
to the ratio of one's imbalance over the square of one's 
speed is of course unknown to the cyclist, and would not 
help him in his performance even were it known. But I 
don't see what is, in principle, inarticulable about this 
knowledge; and I certainly cannot recall anything like a 
state of apprenticeship when learning to ride my first 
bicycle. I saw what other people were doing, but I did 
not learn by imitating them, I learnt by constantly falling, 
and then sometimes not falling, off. It seems there are 
technical skills - like cycling - and social skills - like 
speaking, or counting - and the former do not presuppose 
a tradition in the immediate sense in which the latter do. 
Or take medical diagnosis, another of Polanyi's· examples. 
Unless a doctor can recognise a certain symptom, for 
example the accentuation of the second sound of the 
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pulmonary artery, it is no use his reading descriptions of 
syndromes in which this symptom occurs. 
He must personally know that symptom and he can learn 
this only by repeatedly being given cases for 
auscultation in which the symptom is authoritatively 
known to be present, side by side with other cases in 
which it is authoritatively known to be absent, until 
he has fully realized the difference between them and 
can demonstrate his knowledge practically to the satis-
faction of an expert. 1 4 
It was similar or related observations that led Ludwik 
Fleck in the early 1930s to his traditionalist, pre-Kuhnian 
theory of science. Thus in his explanations of the Wasser-
mann reaction, Fleck points out that, since there is no 
unified theory of the underlying syndrome, different la-
boratories have developed somewhat different quantitative 
procedures to detect it; still, however, 'the experienced 
eye or the "serological touch'" - das 'serologische 
Fiihlen' - proves 'much more important than calculation'. 1 5 
The field of serology, Fleck writes, 'is a little world of 
its own and the ref ore can no more be fully described in 
words than any other field of science'. 1 6 
It is however a fact that important areas of medical 
diagnosis are today conducted by computer programs, 
and it would seem strange to speak of 'personal know-
ledge' or 'touch' with respect to a piece of software. Yet 
these programs are of course based on the knowledge 
of experienced human experts, and it is in fact quite a 
problem to unearth that knowledge in software-digestible 
form. One becomes an expert not simply by absorbing 
explicit knowledge of the type found in textbooks, but 
through experience, that is, through repeated trials, 'fail-
ing, succeeding, wasting time and effort, ... getting a 
feel for a problem, learning when to go by the book and 
when to break the rules'. 1 7 Human experts thereby grad-
ually absorb 'a repertory of working rules of thumb, or 
'
1heuristics", that, combined with book knowledge, make 
them expert practitioners'. 1 8 This practical, heuristic 
knowledge, as attempts to simulate it on the machine have 
shown, is 'hardest to get at because experts - or anyone 
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else - rarely have the self-awareness to recognize what it 
is. So it must be mined out of their heads painstakingly, 
one jewel at a time'. 1 9 
But now. practical knowledge as here described does not 
seem to possess any philosophically interesting char-
acteristics at all, and it is quite disturbing to realise that 
the faculty of judgment, the ability to subsume particular 
instances under given rules and to apply such rules, can 
be imparted to a suitable machine at all, at least in cer-
tain cases. For the machine is of course lacking in that 
social context which seemed so essential for this kind of 
acquisition. 
The problem that confronts us here was recognised by 
Kant, for whom the application of rules seemed to embody 
a vicious sort of circularity. Kant starts out from the idea 
that understanding in general is a matter of rules. Judg-
ment, more particularly, is the faculty of subsuming under 
rules, of distinguishing whether something instantiates a 
given rule. But how, now, could it be possible to formu-
late applicable 'rules for judgment'. For clearly we could 
judge on the basis of such rules only by means of other 
rules, and these, too, would demand guidance from judg-
ment. Thus it appears that, 'though understanding is 
capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with 
rules, judgment is a peculiar talent which can be pr-~tised 
only, and cannot be taught. It is the specific quality of 
so-called mother-wit'. 2 0 Its absence is just what is 
ordinarily called stupidity, for which, according to Kant, 
there is no remedy: 
A physician, a judge, or a ruler may have at his 
command many excellent pathological, legal, or 
political rules, even to the degree that he may 
become a profound teacher of them, and yet, none 
the less, may easily stumble in their application. 
For, although admirable in understanding, he may be 
wanting in natural power of judgment. He may 
comprehend the universal in abstracto, and yet not 
be able to distinguish whether a case in concreto comes 
under it. Or the error may be due to his not having 
received, through examples and actual practice, adequate 
training for this particular act of judgment. Such 
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sharpening of the judgment is indeed the one great 
benefit of examples. 2 , 
Ryle, too, stresses that stupidity is not the same as 
mere lack of knowledge, pointing out that •if, for any 
operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical 
operation had first to be performed and performed intel-
ligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone 
ever to break the circle'. 2 2 And Polanyi has pointed out 
that: 'The application of rules must always rely ultimately 
on acts not determined by rule'. 2 3 
Hayek has drawn from this same idea an important 
conclusion concerning restraints on the transmission of 
knowledge. There will always, he tells us, 'be some rules 
governing a mind which that mind in its then prevailing 
state cannot communicate'. Even if the mind were to 
acquire the capacity of communicating these rules, 'this 
would presuppose that it had acquired further higher 
rules which make the communication of the former pos-
sible but which themselves will still be incommunicable'. 2 4 
Yet it is exactly this infinite regress argument, seemingly 
so central to all philosophising about practical knowledge 
- and of course also to Wittgenstein's later philosophy 2 5 
- which somehow loses its magic once the nature of the 
knowledge built into non-human expert systems has been 
considered. 
Or take the case of Ryle's 'well-trained sailor boy', 
who 'can both tie complex knots and discern whether 
someone else is tying them correctly or incorrectly, deftly 
or clumsily. But he is probably incapable of the difficult 
task of describing in words how the knots should be 
tied'. 2 6 Knots are more easily tied than explained, but 
the boy's presumed inability to do the latter does not 
seem to carry a philosophical message. He might be unable 
to explain anything. Or a detailed terminology of knots 
could be developed, helped by which the boy would have 
no difficulties at all in describing and criticising. Of 
course the usual way to explain tying knots is through 
pictures rather than through words. And here one should 
perhaps say that, though knowledge conveyed through 
pictures might be non-propositional, it does not therefore 
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necessarily follow that it is practical, i.e. non-theoretical, 
in the sense of the present volume. 
3. Traditions and Rationality 
It might be useful, at this stage, to distinguish between 
two positions with regard to the issue of practical know-
ledge. According to the first, this knowledge is a prac-
tical abbreviation within the texture or flow of knowledge 
as such; a device of paramount pragmatic importance per-
haps, but not something whose discovery should basically 
transform our epistemological convictions. According to 
the second position, there is a layer or dimension of 
practical knowledge which could in no sense be dissolved 
into knowledge of a propositional sort. Or perhaps - and 
this would be a stronger version of the same position -
there is a hard layer of practical knowledge which serves 
as the bedrock upon which all knowledge rests. Or indeed 
- to formulate a yet stronger version - all theoretical 
knowledge represents but an articulating, a spelling out, 
of a knowledge which is invariably reducible to practice. 
Philosophers like Wittgenstein, Oakeshott, or Kuhn, clearly 
hold some version of the second position; but Ryle, too, 
flatly states that 'theorising is one practice amongst 
others'. 2 "? 
Now each of these positions has its counterpart within 
the theory of traditions. Let us distinguish between pri-
mary and secondary traditions, and say that secondary 
traditions contain and convey, in an abbreviated and often 
emotionally coloured form, information which could in 
principle, though perhaps only with a loss of convenience, 
be communicated in a purely discursive fashion. The in-
formation embedded in primary traditions on the other 
hand cannot be separated from the way in which it is 
handed down, ·or rather it can be thus separated only 
within a context different in kind from that in which 
these traditions were originally functioning. 
23 
Tradition and Practical Knowledge 
In the case of secondary traditions, in other words, it 
is possible that they be dissolved in such a way that the 
activity whose transmission they serve be not essentially 
impaired. Primary traditions, in contrast, are such that the 
dissolution of the tradition brings with it of necessity the 
dissolution of the relevant knowledge. The thesis to the 
effect that there are primary traditions, a thesis to which 
the present essay subscribes, I shall call the strong tradi-
tionalist thesis, and contrast it with the weak tradition-
alist thesis which denies the existence of primary traditions 
but recognises the existence, and usefulness, of secondary 
ones. The position denying this usefulness might then pro-
perly be called anti-traditionalist. I take the hard-core 
view of practical knowledge to imply, and be implied by, 
the strong traditionalist thesis. In what follows I shall, 
very briefly, call attention to some of the issues bearing 
on this thesis; before doing that, however, I should like 
to touch upon two other, closely related topics. 
The first is rationality. Reason and tradition are usually 
conceived of as opposed, 2 8 and even traditionalist argu-
ments are often enough phrased in such a way as to main-
tain this opposition. The power of the irrational - or of 
the arational - is stressed, along with the importance of 
traditions as creating a dimension of coherence in the 
non-rational realm, as bringing, through their very irra-
tionality, cohesion into society. It is in this sense that 
Karl Popper, quite a traditionalist in his way, writes: 
'What we call social life can exist only if we can know, 
and can have confidence, that there are things and events 
which must be so and cannot be otherwise. - It is here 
that the part played by tradition in our lives becomes 
understandable.' The social world, if it is to be inhabit-
able at all. must contain •a great number of regularities 
to which we can adjust ourselves', regularities whose mere 
existence may be 'more important than their peculiar 
merits or demerits. They are needed as regularities, and 
therefore handed on as traditions, whether or not they 
are in other respects rational or necessary or good or 
beautiful or what you will.' 2 9 
If the strong traditionalist thesis holds, however, then 
this almost utilitarian way of putting things may be mis-
leading. For strong traditionalism implies that reason itself 
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is ultimately grounded in traditions, or, as Oakeshott 
eloquently puts it: 'Rationality' just is 'the certificate we 
give to any conduct which can maintain a place in the 
flow of sympathy, the coherence of activity, which com-
poses a way of living'. 3 0 Hence it will not do to regard 
rationality, as Feyerabend does, as 'one tradition among 
many rather than a standard to which traditions must con-
form'. 3 1 This would still amount to an unjustifiable 
picking out of rationality as some one single tradition, 
as if there were some fixed set of criteria of what is 
rational, independently of the domain to which they were 
applied. Oakeshott, I think, comes closer to finding a 
more adequate formulation when he writes that •no -con-
duct, no action or series of actions, can be "rational" or 
"irrational" out of relation to the idiom of activity to 
which they belong' and goes on to state that 'an activity 
as a whole (science, cooking, historical investigation, 
politics or poetry) cannot be said either to be "rational" 
or "irrational" unless we conceive all idioms of activity 
to be embraced in a single universe of activity'. 3 2 
But the author who, in my opinion, really pointed the 
way here, even if for 60 years no one seems to have em-
barked upon it. was Maurice Halbwachs, in his Les cadres 
sociaux de la memoire. 3 3 •Reason,' Halbwachs wrote, 'is 
actually a striving to raise oneself from a narrower to a 
broader tradition, into which latter the memories not 
merely of one class, but those of all groups will fit. ... 
Reason faces tradition as a broader society faces a nar-
rower one.• 3 4 The tradition capable of absorbing a variety 
of other traditions, or the tradition that emerges as an 
amalgam of various particular ones, will then possess, or 
amount to, what might be called relative rationality; and 
of course all rationality is relative, at least in the sense 
that a 'maximum' of rationality seems impossible to con-
ceive. 
The second topic I feel should be touched upon in the 
present context is the relation between traditionalism and 
the philosophy of mind. It seems to me that the strong 
traditionalist thesis is simply incompatible with what is 
usually called mentalism or intellectualism: the view of 
an autonomous, sovereign mind, of a mind intimately 
acquainted with, and freely operating upon, its own con-
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tents (images, concepts, and the like), a mind for which 
language, in particular, is a mere instrument of com-
munication, an external vehicle expressing, and indeed 
guided by, inner thought-processes. 
Wittgenstein and Ryle are of course well-known critics 
of this view, but their arguments are seldom taken notice 
of by traditionalist writers, generally insensitive to the 
epistemological presuppositions and implications of their 
position. Two notable exceptions were Edmund Burke 
and T. S. Eliot, both of whom did indeed realise these 
implications. In his essay "Tradition and the Individual 
Talent". Eliot wrote: 
The point of view which I am struggling to attack is 
perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the 
substantial unity of the soul; for my meaning is, that 
the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a 
particular medium, which is only a medium and not a 
personality, in which impressions and experiences 
combine in peculiar and unexpected ways ... The 
emotion of art is impersonal. 3 5 
And as to Burke, he not only had a theory of tradi-
tions, but in fact the rudiments of a theory of meaning to 
match the former. Examining the common notion, accord-
ing to which words 'affect the mind by raising in it ideas 
of those things for which custom has appointed them to 
stand' Burke does 'not find that once in twenty times' 
any s~ch idea or picture is formed, and indeed when it is, 
'there is most commonly a particular effort of the ima-
gination for that purpose'. Burke gives here a charming 
example. Suppose, he writes, 
we were to read a passage to this effect: 'The river 
Danube rises in a moist and mountainous soil in the 
heart of Germany, where, winding to and fro, it waters 
several principalities, until, turning into Austria, and 
laving the walls of Vienna, it passes into Hungary; 
there with a vast flood, augmented by the Save and the 
Drave, it quits Christendom, and rolling on the bar-
barous countries which border on Tartary, it enters by 
many mouths into the Black Sea.' In this description 
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many things are mentioned, as mountains, rivers, cities, 
the sea, &c. But let anybody examine himself, and see 
whether he has had impressed on his imagination any 
pictures of a river, mountain, watery soil, Germany, &c. 
Indeed it is impossible, in the rapidity and quick 
succession of words in conversation, to have ideas both 
of the sound of the word, and of the thing represented; 
... nor is it necessary that we should. 3 8 
In the ordinary course of conversation, Burke concludes, 
'we are sufficiently understood without raising any im-
. . h k ' 3 ' Th .. ages of the things concerning wh1c we spea . 1s 1s, 
clearly, an approach to meaning which does not presup-
pose the mentalist view; it is compatible with the idea of 
language as an essentially social institution; it is, in par-
ticular, compatible with the strong traditionalist thesis 
outlined above. 
4. Authority, Convention, Custom, Prejudice 
Returning now to a brief examination of this thesis itself, 
we have to take into account, first of all, that the term 
•tradition' is surrounded by a family of related terms. This 
family would include terms like •authority', 'convention', 
'custom', 'disposition'. 'habit', 'institution', 'mentality', 
'mores', 'norm', 'paradigm', •practice', 'prejudice', 'rule', 
'skill', 'style'. 'taste', 'technique\ The interconnections 
within this family are far from unequivocal, the meanings 
of most of the terms vary and overlap. Clearly, both a 
survey of connotations and a list of stipulations is called 
for. 
For our present purposes, however, we shall have to 
confine ourselves to setting forth the details of certain 
specific cases. Consider, first of all, the term 'authority'. 
Here, according to Halbwachs, it is traditions which do 
the job of conferring authority upon certain roles and 
persons. 3 8 Polanyi, on the other hand, seems to suggest 
that the converse is true, i.e., as he puts it, that it is 
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only by 'a previous act of a/ filiation'. by a 'combined 
action of authority and trust', that the assimilation of 
basic traditions will become possible at all. 3 9 It is at this 
point that we meet the philosophy of Wittgenstein. The 
role played by authority in Wittgenstein's work needs no 
special mention here. Indeed Wittgenstein notoriously 
goes so far as to suggest that one 'must recognize certain 
authorities in order to make judgments at all', 4 0 and 
seems to underline the parallel between authority and 
tradition when declaring: 'Tradition is not something a 
man can learn; not a thread he can pick up when he 
feels like it; any more than a man can choose his own 
ancestors.' 4 1 
Or take the term 'convention'. For Hume and for Burke 
this notion was allied with, not opposed to, the notion of 
tradition. As Wilkins puts it: 
Social conventions such as rules for the acquisition 
and transmission of property are artificial in the sense 
of being man-made, but given man's social nature and 
the mutual dependence of men there is a sense in which 
they are natural as well. The important thing for 
understanding both Hume and Burke is their general 
refusal to equate artificial with arbitrary. 4 2 
In the rather different context of the philosophy of sci-
ence, Fleck, too, strives to show that in the connotation 
of the term 'convention' the element of arbitrariness has 
no primary role to play. He stresses 'how little conven-
tions, which from the point of view of logic may seem 
equally possible, are in fact felt to be of equal value'. 4 3 
The supposed 'epistemological choice' is in fact much 
rather historically and culturally dependent, so that the 
convention is constrained on all sides by what has gone 
before. And Arnold Hauser, in the domain of the philo-
sophy of art, draws a close terminological parallel between 
convention and tradition. 'Spontaneity and convention, 
originality and tradition' are, he writes, 
inseparable from each other. The process of artistic 
creation is not one in which spontaneous personal 
experiences become communicable and accessible only 
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. 1 f b t one in which the through conventiona orms, u 
experiences to be depicted move from the ou~se~ 
along conventionally regulated lines. · · · ArthiSUCk to 
· · t of but t an s • 
expression comes about not m spi e • . 4 4 
the resistance which convention offers to it. 
. d' . 1· t s far as the issue 
Clearly Hauser is a stnct tra 1tiona 1s a . , 
• . . th t m •convention ' 
of artistic creativity goes. But it ~s e er . h f Haus-
not the term 'tradition'• that carries, the we1~ t 'oare hew-
er's argument. The connotations 01: co~v.e::101nd here, 
ever no less blurred than those of traditio ·. h H lbwachs 
most modern authors would seem to agree wit a t 4 s' 
h me as free agreemen · for whom convention means t e sa . •custom'. 
Or consider again the next term on our h 5l, . ·n 
' , . . s Burton Leiser 1 
It is a term extremely rich m meaning. · . s rans-
his book on the subject lists at leaSt _nine mam 1 °°:en's to 
·ng from mere habits through sanctioned regu .atzo ' 
I . . ' 1 h"ch by their very 
so called constzlutrve rules, rues w 1 • to 
definition, could not be broken. 4 6 Before turn}n~;00:r 
traditions proper, let me select one more ter~ _r • It 
list of related notions, namely the term 'preJutc~~lated 
was in connection with this term that Burke or he 
one of his most often-quoted pa_ssa~es. We do ;.ot, 
wrote, cast away all our old preJud1ces. Rathe · 
we cherish them to a very considerable degree; aod , 
1 e cherish them to take more shame to ourse ves, w of 
because they are prejudices • : • Many of 0::-:~~es, 
speculation instead of exploding general P J. d Ill 
employ their sagacity to discover the latent wis O k 
which prevails in them. If they find what th~Y ~~e • 
(and they seldom fail,) they think it more w1s·~volved 
continue with the prejudice, with. th~ reaso~ ; 0 leave ' 
than to cast away the coat of preJudice, a~ d. with 
n othing but the naked reason; because preJU ice, on 
· · to that reas • its reason has a motive to give action Pre-
, • 1 · ·t manence and an affection which w1l give 1 per : . t 
judice is of ready application in the emergency, 1f 
previously engages the mind in a steady ~our:: 0hesi-
wisdom and virtue and does not leave ! e m led 
tating in the mom;nt of decision, skeptic~l, 1:'uzze his 
and unresolved. Prejudice renders a mans virtu 
29 
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habit, and not a series of unconnected acts. Through 
just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature. 4 ' 
Burke's reluctance to be left with nothing but 'naked 
reason' is a reluctance characteristic of the strong tradi-
tionalist attitude; but note also the concluding reference 
to 'just' prejudice, with its implication that not all preju-
dices are just. And it is of course the idea of the unjust, 
the malign, prejudice which constitutes the generally 
accepted meaning of this term. It is in this sense that 
Ernst Mach could speak of 'the fetters of inherited preju-
dice', 4 8 or of the 'terrible power' of what we call - as 
the translation puts it - 'prejudgment or prejudice', i.e. 
'habitual judgment, applied to a new case without ante-
cedent tests'. 4 9 But even Mach, definitely no tradition-
alist, concedes that without certain 'fixed habitudes of 
thought' 5 0 new problems would not become perceivable at 
all. 'No one could exist intellectually,' Mach writes, 
If he had to form judgments on every passing 
experience, instead of allowing himself to be con-
trolled by the judgments he has already formed .... 
On prejudices, that is, on habitual judgments not 
tested in every case to which they are applied, reposes 
a goodly portion of the thought and work of the natural 
scientist. On prejudices reposes most of the conduct of 
society. With the sudden disappearance of prejudice 
society would hopelessly dissolve. 5 1 
It was in this spirit that Robert Musil, himself the author 
of a dissertation on the philosophy of Mach, pointed out 
that man, in his potentialities, plans, and emotions, 'must 
first of all be hedged in by prejudices, traditions, diffi-
culties and limitations of every kind, like a lunatic in his 
strait- jacket, and only then will whatever he is capable of 
bringing forth perhaps have some value, solidity and per-
manence'. 5 2 
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5. In Defence of Strong Traditionalism 
Of the term 'tradition', the OED provides some excellent 
definitions. Tradition, it says, is the 'action of handing 
over (some- thing material) to another; delivery, transfer'. 
It is the delivery, 'esp. oral delivery, of information or 
instruction'. It is the 'act of transmitting or handing down 
or fact of being handed down, from one to another, or 
from generation to generation; transmission of statements, 
beliefs, rules, customs, or the like, esp. by word of mouth, 
or by practice without writing'. It is, also, that 'which is 
thus handed down; a statement, belief, or practice trans-
mitted (esp. orally) from generation to generation'. 'More 
vaguely', the OED goes on, a tradition is a 'long estab-
lished and generally accepted custom, or method of pro-
cedure, having almost the force of a law; an immemorial 
usage'. 
Clearly these explications, however apt, do not solve 
our theoretical problems, partly since the explanatory 
terms they employ - 'handing down', 'rule', 'custom', 
'practice', 'law' - themselves stand in need of elucida-
tion, and partly because, as I tried to show in the fore-
going, a host of yet other notions would seem to be of 
relevance here. Obviously, a nominal explication of the 
concept of tradition, though necessary, is not sufficient. 5 3 
Rather more useful are certain particular definitions, like 
for example the one Hobsbawm gives of 'invented' tradi-
tions, which are taken to mean '[l 1 a set of practices, [2] 
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules 
and £31 of a ritual or symbolic nature, which [41 seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repe-
tition, which [5] automatically implies continuity with 
the past'. 5 4 Useful, too, are explications such as those 
given by J. G. A. Pocock, who is concerned with tradi-
tions as a matter of the handing on of those ways of 
acting which contribute to our membership in a given 
society. 
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In its simplest form a tradition must thus be thought 
of as an indefinite series of repetitions of an action, 
which on each occasion is performed on the assumption 
that it has been performed before; its performance is 
authorised - though the nature of authorisation may 
vary widely - by the knowledge, or the assumption, of 
previous performance. In the pure state, as it were, 
such a tradition is without a conceivable beginning; 
each performance presupposes a previous performance, 
in infinite regress. Furthermore, it may well be that it 
is the assumption, rather than the factual information, 
of previous performance that is operative. 5 5 
Still, what we need is not so much definitions as much 
rather a detailed examination of the ways in which tradi-
tions in all their forms and varieties function at the 
different levels and in the different spheres of social life, 
and all the ways in which traditions relate to such gen-
eral phenomena of social life as spontaneous orders, devi-
ance and normality, creativity, learning, group behaviour, 
and so on. Also the issue of so-called national or ethnic 
traditions, as well as the culture/civilisation contrast 
would merit special attention. 
Here there exists already a substantial body of import-
ant research upon which one can draw. And I think much 
of that research directly supports the strong traditionalist 
thesis as formulated above. Thus with all the recent stress 
on linguistic universals and on the biological foundations 
of language, there has not survived in the literature any 
serious attempt to Question the existence of essential 
layers of language culturally structured and traditionally 
transmitted. Noam Chomsky's oddly impoverished notion of 
linguistic creativity, 5 6 a creativity determined by genetic 
inheritance and following inborn patterns, has become a 
curio of the past. In a 1982 study Slobin and Bever could 
once more revert to Bloomfield's classic dictum: 'We 
speak ... by certain well-practiced schemes, - sentence-
skeletons that require but the variation of a few words 
from utterance to utterance', and point to the language-
specific nature and broad contextual setting of 'schema-
development'. 5 ' 
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With respect to science, the role of traditions is an 
issue which, due to the Popper-Oakeshott controversy, 5 8 
and especially to the controversy surrounding Kuhn's 
work, 5 9 has recently received ample attention. Important 
here is David Hollinger's observation that Kuhn has in 
fact applied to the history of science the conventional 
historiographic view of the part played by traditions in 
politics, arts, and the life of society in general. 6 0 Thus 
'Kuhn's notion of the "paradigm", his most celebrated 
and maligned term', as Hollinger writes, 
embodies the sense that activities are defined and 
controlled by tradition, and that tradition consists of 
a set of devices, or principles, that have proven their 
ability to order the experience of a given social 
constituency. 6 1 
And how does it carry out this function? By providing 
the community with the capacity to distinguish one ac-
tivity from another and by setting priorities among those 
activities - so that the members of the community will 
tend to perform those activities which serve to consol-
idate the community itself. 'Tradition, then, is socially 
grounded, and its function is that of organization'; and 
to the extent that its constituent organising devices 'have 
enough flexibility to sustain them through successive, 
contingent experiences: to the extent that a tradition can 
expand and adapt, like the English common law, it is 
that much more likely to retain its constituency'. 6 2 
As Hollinger also points out, in different communities 
of which the community of modern-day natural scien-
tists is only one specific kind - the role played by 
traditions may vary widely. Kuhn himself has written an 
essay in which he draws attention to the particular way 
traditions function in art, as contrasted with science. In 
art - but not in science - Kuhn emphasises, a tradition 
might be dead yet its products still living. Or, again, 
'though resistance to innovation is a characteristic com-
mon to both art and science, posthumous recognition re-
curs with regularity only in the arts.' 6 3 Also, even though 
artists •can and sometimes do voluntarily undertake dra-
matic changes in style on one or more occasions during 
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their lives', 6 4 still. 'most artists begin by painting in the 
style of their masters' 6 5 - and this is not an incidental 
fact. 
Mention has been made above of the traditionalist 
theory of art of Arnold Hauser. Again and again Hauser 
emphasises that: 'Every artist expresses himself in the Ian 
guage of his predecessors, his models, and his teachers•, 
so that 'every newly created work owes more to other 
works than to the invention and experience of its cre-
ator'. 6 6 Wittgenstein. too, expresses a view of this sort 
when he says that 'every composer changed the rules, 
but the variation was very slight; not all the rules were 
changed. The music was still good by a great many of 
the old rules'. 6 ' According to Robert Musil, even the 
spontaneity of an artist is inconceivable without handed-
down forms and concepts: it is those very handed-down 
forms that become a source of originality in the creative 
process. 6 8 We have already heard Hauser insisting that 
conventional forms of expression themselves help to create 
the content of what will be expressed. Hence. even though 
it is true that 'expression always moves on well-worn 
tracks, still, the tracks multiply and bifurcate as they are 
being traveled'. 6 9 A related position has been developed, 
perhaps surprisingly, by Karl Popper, who sees the 
canonisation of Church melodies, i.e. certain restrictions 
on musical usage, as having produced the conditions 
against which counterpoint could develop. 'It was the 
established cantus /irmus which provided the framework, 
the order, the regularity that made possible inventive 
freedom without chaos.'' 0 
It is however in theories of law, politics, and of social 
life in general - theories in which such apparently 
tradition-independent categories as truth and beauty 
never really played a role - that the idea of an order 
imposed by mere traditions has always had its strongest 
appeal. The works of Carl Menger, inaugurator of the 
Austrian School of Economics. might convey a suggestion 
of the unlikely parallels here obtaining between Anglo-
Saxon and Austro-German thought. Thus consider the way 
in which Menger, in his Investigations into the Method of 
the Social Sciences, exploits ideas derived from Burke. 
Burke was, as Menger himself puts it, 'probably the first. 
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who, trained for it by the spirit of English jurisprudence, 
emphasized with full awareness the significance of the 
organic structures of social life and the partly unintended 
origin of these'. ' 1 Burke taught that numerous institutions 
of his country 
were not the result of positive legislation or of the 
conscious common will of society directed toward 
establishing these, but the unintended result of 
historical development. He first taught that what 
existed and had stood the test, what had developed 
historically. was again to be respected, in contrast to 
the projects of immature desire for innovation. Here-
with he made the first breach in the one-sided 
rationalism and pragmatism of the Anglo-French Age 
of Enlightenment. ' 2 
There is, Menger maintains, a 'subconscious wisdom' 
manifested in those institutions that come about organic-
ally; and the meddlesome advocates of reform 'would do 
well less to trust their own insight and energy than to 
leave the reshaping of society to the "historical process 
of development".• ' 3 In a similar spirit, today's leading 
exponent of the Austrian School, F. A. von Hayek, 
stresses that 'since we owe the order of our society to a 
tradition of rules which we only imperfectly understand, 
all progress must be based on tradition'. ' 4 But the grand 
old man of contemporary German philosophy, Hans-
Georg Gadamer, too, realises that the ordering of life 
through the rules of law and morality always amounts to 
more than the application of general principles. Thus 
Gadamer sees our knowledge of law and morality as being 
•always supplemented - indeed almost productively deter-
mined - by the individual case. The judge does not merely 
apply the law in concrete; he contributes through his 
judgment to the unfolding of the law itself'. ' 5 And in the 
domain of legal theory, too, the ideas of the later Witt-
genstein have provided new impetus. Thus it was partly 
under Wittgenstein's influence that H. L. A. Hart 
developed his conception of law as a combination of 
'primary' and 'secondary• social rules. Hart's primary rules 
seem to be a proper subclass of the primary traditions we 
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des~ribed above. They are customs supported by strong 
social Pressure, coming into being through 'the slow 
Process of growth, whereby courses of conduct once 
tho.ught optional_ become first habitual or usual, and then 
obhgatory', ;, 6 Without their prior existence no legal 
system could be bu.itt up at all. ' 
, These ideas have relevance, too, in the sphere of educa-
t~on, w~ere anyone guided by a sense for primary tradi-
tions wd~ soon find fault with many of the prevailing 
orthodoxies of the Present day. Here again, the writings 
of T. S. Kuhn have shed new light on certain crucial 
Problems. For .Kuhn, with his tru]y revolutionary notion 
~f norz:na! scien~e, underscores the need for rigid tradi-
tt~ns ~~thm Par.t1cuJar scientific groups if coherent 
~c1enti~1c work 1s to be possible at au. 7 7 This view has 
1
mmed.1ate consequ~nc~s. for educational theory. As Kuhn 
has. po1~ted out, sc1ent1f1c progress is, at least in the 
basic sc1~nce~, _not achfoved by 'liberal' education, by 
encouraging dwergent' thinking. i 8 And one can add that, 
at the elementary level, all learning seems to require a 
measure_ of external rigidity. Wittgenstein's later philo-
S?P~Y. did much to lay bare the reasons for this, and it is 
szgnific~nt that it was his work on an elementary spelling 
book, his Wl5rterbuch /fir Volksschulen of 1926 which 
served a! the i~mediate prelude to that philos~phy. 1 9 
In .speih,:i-s. as in elementary mathematics, Wittgenstein 
beheved in authoritarian teaching methods methods whose 
advantages are today finally beginning to ;merge from a 
nu?l~er of e~ucational surveys and reports. 8 0 Wittgen-
stein s work m this fi~ld is of relevance, too, in relation 
to the con.cept of deviance, where our theoretical atti-
fdes _ar~ JO many ways bound up wfrh those on education . 
. hus it 1s to be expected that an awareness of the essen-
tial role that is played by more or Jess rigid traditions in 
human _communities will, again, preclude the acceptance of 
the ra_d1cally permissive views that have too often held 
sway m the recent past. 8 • 
The very conviction that only a social fabrk entire-
ly destroyed can be devoid of traditional elements wHJ 
howe~er enab!e. one also to see through the claims of an 
e~cessive trad1_t1ona1ism. For it wiH enable one to recog-
nise also the vmues and the inevitability of invented 
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traditions and thereby to withstand the romantic yearning 
• · 1· the one for bonds derived from the past. Nationa ism on . h 
, · ·1· t' n' rn t e hand, and the attacks on contemporary c1v1 1sa lO 
name of some more authentic 'culture' on the other., are 
two notable instances of an excessive traditionalist 1deo-
logy, National divisions and nationalist sentiments are 
invariably much more the result of specific typ:s of. ma-
terial conditions affecting the living. 8 2 Yet natwnah~t 
· 1· · onom1c ideology as often as not forfe1ts the po 1t1co-e,c . 
present white focusing on an imagined past. S1m1~ar!)'.• 
the foe of 'civilisation' while yearning for the f1ctrtio~s 
warmth of an age that ~ever existed, is blind t~ the rea 
traditions of his society, to the actual form of hfe that_ 
surrounds him. A seldom-quoted remark by Wittgen~tetn 
seems to be appropriate here. •1t is very remark~ble, he 
wrote in 1946, 'that we should be inclined to thm~ of 
civilization - houses, trees, cars, etc. - as separatm~ t 
man from his origins, from what is lofty and eterna i e c. 
Our civilized environment, along with its trees and. P a~ts, 
strikes us then as though it were cheaply wrapped m ;e -
Jophane and isolated from everything great, from Go , as 
it were. That is a remarkable picture that intrudes upon 
us.' s 3 
Notes 
1. Thanks are due to the Alexander von Humboldt Stift-
ung, under whose auspices the ideas in this paper were 
brought to fruition in their present form. 
2. Ryle 1949, p, 59. 
3. Polanyi J 964, p. 14. The cited passage is taken. fr~: 
the Introduction. but similar passages occur also m 
main body of the text, e.g. on pp. 42f. and 76. 
4. Polanyi 1958, p, 49. 
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5. Ibid., p. 53. Similar formulations can be found also in 
Ziman 1968, e.g. on pp. 7 and 10: 
The fact is that scientific investigation ... is a prac-
tical art. It is not learnt out of books, but by imitation 
and experience ... The young scientist does not study 
formal logic, but he learns by imitation and experience 
a number of conventions that embody strong social rela-
tionships. 
6. Oakeshott 1962, pp. 102f. The passage is taken from 
the essay "Rational Conduct" of J 950. 
7. Kuhn 1970, p. 275. This seems also to be the idea 
taken up by David Bloor when he writes: 
predicates are learnt on the basis of a finite number 
of instances. These are provided by teachers or author-
ities who must simultaneously inform and control the 
behaviour of the learner. The learner's task is to 
acquire a sense of the similarity between the cases to 
which he is exposed as instances of a given concept. 
His sense of similarity and difference must be matched 
to those of other language users. This involves grasping 
the conventions which are involved in the judgements 
about similarity and difference. (Bloor 1981, p. 88) 
The parallels (and differences) between Oakeshott and 
Kuhn are illuminatingly brought out in an essay by M. 
D. King of 1971. Kuhn, King writes, 
states emphatically that the term 'paradigm' denotes 
not a world-view but a specific example of actual 
scientific practice which serves as a model for a 
research community and implicitly defines the legitimate 
problems and methods of a research field for successive 
generations of practitioners . . . Faithfulness to the 
traditions which spring from paradigms or sets of 
paradigms is the hallmark of genuine 'science•. To break 
faith with established tradition is to risk being 
labelled a crank, a charlatan, or being made an 'outlaw'. 
- A sociologist reading Kuh n's attack on scientific 
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rationalism can hardly fail to be struck by how closely 
it resembles Oakeshott's famous onslaught against 
political rationalism; Kuhn's science like Oakeshott's 
politics is subject to authority of concrete traditions 
rather than that of abstract 'reason'. Both are seen as 
practical activities that, to use Oakeshott's distinction, 
involve not merely technical knowledge (or technique) 
which 'is susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, 
directions, and maxims' and which may therefore be 
learned from a book and thereafter 'applied', but also 
practical knowledge which cannot be reduced to rules, 
cannot be written down and therefore 'can neither be 
taught nor learned, but only imparted.• 
(The Oakeshott reference is to his essay "Rationalism in 
Politics" of 1947 .) 
8. Feyerabend 1978. p. 26. 
9. Von Wright 1982, p. 178. 
10. Cf. Haller 1982, p. 184. 
11. The crucial passages are Philosophical Investigations, 
I, 85, 198-208, 239-42. 
J 2. This is how Plato seems to have conceived the matter: 
see the reconstruction in Wieland 1982, esp. p. 254: 'Of 
course knowledge of this kind' - e.g. the expert know-
ledge possessed by craftsmen - 'will be transmitted always 
only through a process of instruction and practice. It will 
never be capable of being transferred like an object. It is 
paradigmatic of the knowledge of the craftsman that he 
who possesses it cannot distance himself f ram it ... It 
cannot be objectified, because - as a happy metaphor of 
Plato's has it - it is as it were grown into the action 
itself.' 
13. Personal Knowledge, pp. 49f. 
14. Ibid., pp. 54f. 
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15. Fleck 1935, p. 72 (p. 53 of translation). Incidentally, 
the notion of practical knowledge is, in modern literature, 
foreshadowed in the work of Max Scheler, who presumably 
had some, direct or indirect, influence on Fleck (cf. Fleck 
1935, p. 64, n. 29). As Scheler wrote in his 11Der Formal-
ismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik" of 1913: 
There is something like 'practical' obeying and 'disobey-
ing' of laws, but not of laws which 'control' natural 
acting as natural laws control, in the sense that natural 
acting would conform 'to' them in an objective manner. 
The laws that we have in mind are not at all given as 
laws (in a form of perception, of 'being conscious of 
. . .'); they are experienced as fulfilled or broken in 
the execution of acting. And it is only in these 
experiences that they are given. In this sense the acting 
artist is 'controlled' by the aesthetic laws of his art 
without 'applying' them; nor does he realize their 
fulfillment or violation only in the effect, i.e., in the 
work of art produced. In this sense, too, it belongs to 
the essence of the 'crime' that he who breaks laws 
experiences himself as breaking them while acting; these 
are laws with which he reckons in practice, whether he 
or others are concerned, without having to have the 
slightest knowledge of such laws, and without having to 
have 'thought' about them (pp. 141f. of the translation). 
The notion approximated here is of course not the 'prac-
tical-technical intelligence' described by Scheler in his 
1980, esp. p. 79. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Feigenbaum and McCorduck 1984, p. 67. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid., p. 82. 
20. Critique of Pure Reason, A132-4. 
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21. Ibid. 
22. The Concept of Mind, pp. 29f. 
23. Science, Faith and Society, p. 14. 
24. Hayek 1967, p. 62. 
25. See, e.g., Philosophical Investigations, I, 82-6 and 
198ff. 
26. The Concept of Mind, p. 56. 
27. Ibid., p.26. - Similarly Feyerabend: 'What is called 
"reason" and .. practice" are ... two different types of 
practice' ( 1978, p. 26). Also Arnold Gehlen, even if on the 
basis of some rather crude arguments: 'Human knowledge 
is ... almost to be defined as a phase of action' (1940, 
p. 52). 
28. See e.g. the discussion in Coleman, .. Is There Reason 
in Tradition? .. (1968), cf. esp. pp. 242ff. 
29. Popper 1948, pp. 130f. 
30. Rationalism in Politics, p. 109. Recently the same 
point was made by Oswald Schwemmer. One participates, 
writes Schwemmer, in the 'Handlungskultur', i.e. in the 
universally available forms of activity of a given group or 
society; and by the very possibility of such participation 
the rational character of those forms is established: 'the 
capacity of he who acts of being able to act in a way 
intelligible to others ... thereby lends his actions an 
elementary rationality'. (Schwemmer l 984, p. 191) 
31. Science in a Free Society, p. 7. 
32. Rationalism in Politics, p. 102. 
33. In Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of 
Reality, a book which amply stresses the significance of 
the 'pretheoretical level' of knowledge in society (e.g. on 
p. 65), mention is made of Halbwachs' category of 'col-
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lective memory' (ibid., p. 202) - but not of his combining 
'memory' and 'tradition' with reason. 
34. Quoted from the German edition, pp, 348£. and 383. 
Halbwachs' suggestion actually represents a third way 
between the usual alternatives of either equating ration-
ality with an attitude having some unique, standard struc-
tural characteristics, an attitude marred only by false 
logic, traditions, and emotions; or by accepting as rational 
any views or positions that are felt by the groups or per-
sons holding them to be appropriate under the obtaining 
circumstances. These are the two alternatives called -
rather misleadingly - the "traditionelle Rationalitflts-
konzeption" and the 'anti-traditionalistisches Rational-
itfitskonzept' by Karl Acham, in his essay of I 984. 
35. The essay was first published in 1917. Quoted from 
Eliot I 960, pp. 56-9. 
36. From Burke's "Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of 
our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (l 756/7), pp, 
246-52. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Halbwachs, Das Gedfl.chtnis, p. 355. 
39. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 207f. 
40. On Certainty, 161. cf. also 493. 
41. Wittgenstein 1980, p. 76. 
42. Wilkins 1967. p. 61. A similar opposition between the 
artificial and the arbitrary is defended by Hayek in his 
"'Three Sources of Human Values" (appendix to Hayek 
1979). 
43. Fleck 1935, p. 9. 
44. Hauser 1951, pp. 28, 30, 21. 
42 
Tradition and Practical Knowledge 
45. Halbwachs contrasts the 'purely conventional' with 
the 'purely traditional' (Das Gedfichtnis, p. 389). 
46. Leiser 1969, pp. 7-47. 
47. Burke, .. Reflections on the Revolution in France" 
( 1790), pp, 346f. 
48. Mach 1943, p. 214. 
49. Ibid., p. 232. 
50. Ibid., p. 227. 
51. Ibid., p. 232. 
52. The Man Without Qualities, Vol. I, p. 52. 
53. This is especially so if it actually fails to rise above, 
or indeed falls below. the dictionary level, as when 
Edward Shits writes: 
Tradition means many things. In its barest, most 
elementary sense, it means simply a traditum; it is 
anything which is transmitted or handed down from the 
past to the present. It makes no statement about what 
is handed down or in what particular combination or 
whether it is a physical object or a cultural 
construction; it says nothing about how long it has been 
handed down or in what manner . . . The degree of 
rational deliberation which has entered into its creation, 
presentation, and reception likewise has nothing to do 
with whether it is a tradition .... Tradition - that 
which is handed down - includes material objects, 
beliefs about all sorts of things, images of persons and 
events, practices and institutions. It includes buildings, 
monuments, landscapes, sculptures, paintings, books, 
tools, machines, ... practices and institutions made up 
of human actions. {Shils 1981, p. 12.) 
54. Hobsbawm 1983, p. 1. 
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55. Pocock, pp. 209 and 212. 
56. Cf. e.g. Sampson 1979. pp. 7 and 105. 
57. Slobin and Bever 1982, esp. pp, 229 and 253. 
58. See Oakeshott's Rationalism in Politics, and Popper's 
paper of 1948. 
59. See esp. the Gutting and Lakatos-Musgrave volumes 
(see Kuhn 1970), as well as Kuhn 1977. 
60. Hollinger 1980, pp. 196ff. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid., pp. l 97f. 
63. ••comment on the Relations of Science and Art", in 
Kuhn 1977, pp. 346 and 348. 
64. Ibid., p. 349. 
65. Ibid. 
66. The Sociology of Art, pp. 30f. 
67. Wittgenstein 1967, p. 6. A similar thesis, incidentally. 
lies at the root of Arnold Schoenberg's conception of 
musical development and is echoed also in the paper by 
Smith, below. 
68. There are concepts, Musil writes in 1934, which for 
the poet constitute 
the concepts which he has inherited, with whose help 
he has painstakingly consolidated his personal self. He 
does not even need to be in agreement with them all, 
he can strive to change them, yet he will still remain 
tied to them all much more than he is- tied to the 
ground on which he walks. The poet is not only the 
expression of a momentary state of his soul - even 
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should it be one that will introduce a new epoch. What 
he hands down is not decades but millenia old. (Musil 
1978, p. 1250.) 
Or, as he put in an essay of 1931, even the most independ-
ent writer does not produce anything •which could not be 
shown to be almost without remainder dependent upon 
what has been handed down, both in farm and in content'. 
Thus: •one can only speak of originality where there is a 
tradition also.' (Ibid., p. 1207) The connection between 
creativity and underlying traditions is explored in greater 
detail in Grassl and Smith 1986. 
69. The Sociology of Art, pp. 31 and 21. 
70. Popper 1976, p. 58. 
71. Menger 1883, p. I 73. Menger's ideas in this connec-
tion were inspired also by the work of Carl van Savigny, 
chief representative of the German historical school of 
legal theory. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Ibid., p. 91. 
74. Hayek 1979, p. 167. 
75. Gadamer 1965, p, 35. 
76. Hart 1963, p. 90. 
77. See ch.III of his The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, and also the paper "The Essential Tension: Tradi-
tion and Innovation in Scientific Research" (1959), in his 
1977. 
78. "The Essential Tension", pp. 226ff. 
79. 'Only a dictionary,' wrote Wittgenstein in his Preface, 
'makes it possible to hold the student completely respons-
ible for the spelling of what he has written because it 
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furnishes him with reliable measures for finding and 
correcting his mistakes, provided he has a mind to do so.' 
Wittgenstein 1977, p. XXXI. 
80. Cf. e.g. Bennett 1976. Current West-German percep-
tions are especially instructive. There, in the early 1970s, 
it was declared that 'broadening of linguistic competence' 
should supplant 'training in the norms of "standard Ger-
man'" in general and the 'learning of orthography' in 
particular. The results, as the progressive weekly Spiegel 
tells us, are by now catastrophic. Standard German was 
seen by the proponents of reform as the language of a 
certain class and as having been employed by this class as 
a means for the stabilisation of the existing structure of 
society. The effect of their reforms, however, has been 
that the ability of young Germans to write correctly, to 
read, and indeed to express themselves, has deteriorated 
drastically. And what sort of democracy is this, asks the 
Spiegel, where citizens are not capable of articulating 
their views? (Issue of 9 July 1984.) 
81. 'What makes an individual a member of society and 
gives him claims is that he obeys its rules', writes F. A. 
von Hayek. 'Wholly contradictory views may give him 
rights in other societies but not in ours. For the science 
of anthropology all cultures or morals may be equally 
good (though I doubt that this is true), but we maintain 
our society by treating others as less so.' (Hayek 1979, p. 
172) 
82. 'Instead of being automatically united by a shared his-
tory, men ... cannot share the historical events through 
which they live, unless they are already in some sense 
united.' (Deutsch 1953, p. 5.) On some important material 
determinants giving rise to feelings of nationalism see also 
Gellner 1964. 
83. Wittgenstein. Cu/lure and Value, p, SO. 
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52 
Theory and Practice: The Point of Contact 
Roderick M. Chisholm 
1. Endeavour 
What follows is a highly theoretical discussion of the point 
of contact between theory and practice. My hope is to de-
scribe these things clearly and precisely and with the use 
of as few undefined terms as possible. 
Theory and practice come together when a person's 
intentional attitudes determine the way he acts upon the 
world. Our 'theory' is constituted by the beliefs that we 
have, and our 'practice' by our endeavours. Endeavour, 
like believing and judging, is an intentional act or atti-
tude, and it exhibits all those features commonly associ-
ated with intentionality. 
An example of endeavour is expressed by the follow-
ing locution: 
S endeavours to bring it about that so-and-so. 
An alternative is: 
S endeavours to be such that so-and-so. 
The phrase replacing 'so-and-so' may be said to describe 
the content of the endeavour. This content may be ex-
pressed in such well-formed sentences as 'there is peace 
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